We do it for animals, why not people?

“We Do It to Animals, Why Not People?”

By Tamlyn de Beer

One of the most common arguments for assisted suicide or euthanasia appeals to the way we treat animals. We euthanise dogs and cats to prevent suffering, so why should human beings not be given the same option?

At first glance, the argument appears compassionate and straightforward. But before addressing it directly, we must first examine the assumption beneath it: are animals and human beings morally the same kind of being?

Because unless that assumption is established, the comparison does not automatically follow.

After all, many actions that are morally permissible toward one kind of being would be horrifying toward another. If someone argued, “We burn wood, therefore we may burn people,” we would immediately recognize the absurdity of the comparison. The point is not that animals are equivalent to wood, nor that people are equivalent to wood. The point is that moral treatment depends upon the kind of being involved. One cannot simply move from “we do X to one thing” to “therefore we may do X to another” without first establishing moral equivalence between them.

And we clearly do not treat animals and human beings as morally interchangeable.

There are obligations that apply uniquely to human beings: prohibitions against murder, theft, assault, exploitation, and abuse. Likewise, there are actions involving animals that would be morally unacceptable if applied to humans: breeding them, owning them, confining them for human use, or making life-and-death decisions on their behalf without consent.

In fact, the issue of consent itself exposes an important weakness in the analogy. Animals are routinely euthanised without their consent because we do not regard them as autonomous moral agents capable of informed moral decision-making. Yet most supporters of assisted suicide would strongly reject the idea that human beings may be euthanised without consent. But once consent becomes morally decisive, the comparison between animal euthanasia and human euthanasia already begins to break down. The very need for consent points toward a deeper recognition that human beings occupy a different moral category from animals.

There is also a deeper problem with the slogan itself. Even if one argued that humans and animals should be treated consistently, it would not automatically follow that euthanasia should therefore extend to humans. The argument could just as easily move in the opposite direction: perhaps we should reconsider euthanasia for animals rather than normalise it for people. The slogan alone does not establish which direction moral consistency should move. It simply assumes the conclusion from the outset.

The question, then, is not merely whether euthanasia reduces suffering. The deeper question is why euthanasia is assumed to be one of the treatments that should transfer from animals to humans while many other animal-related practices clearly should not.

Are Animals and Human Beings Morally the Same?

It is sometimes argued that distinguishing between animals and humans is merely “speciesism” — an irrational preference for one’s own species. But the distinction being made here is not arbitrary loyalty toward one biological group over another. It is grounded in the recognition that human beings possess a kind of moral agency and responsibility animals do not.

This does not mean animals are worthless, nor does it justify cruelty toward them. Animals are living creatures capable of suffering, and human beings have genuine moral obligations to treat them humanely. Cruelty toward animals is rightly condemned precisely because animals possess value beyond that of mere objects.

But valuing animals is not the same as claiming animals and humans occupy the same moral category.

Animals can display remarkable intelligence, emotional attachment, cooperation, and even forms of social behaviour. But we do not treat animals as moral agents in the same sense we treat human beings. We do not place animals on trial for murder, hold them morally accountable for injustice, or expect them to reason about moral obligations and universal duties.

The distinction cuts both ways: human beings bear greater moral responsibility precisely because human beings possess a different kind of moral status.

Consider a survival scenario. Suppose you were stranded in the wilderness with another person and an animal, and killing one became necessary for survival. Most people would conclude that it is morally preferable to kill the animal rather than the person.

Why?

Not because animals have no value, but because human life is widely recognized as possessing a unique kind of moral worth. This intuition is not merely tribal preference toward one’s own species. It reflects the recognition that different kinds of beings generate different kinds of moral obligations.

The same principle appears elsewhere in ordinary moral reasoning. There was once a case in which privately owned wild animals escaped into a populated area and threatened human life. Police officers eventually shot the animals to protect nearby people. Few would argue the officers should instead have allowed the people to die in order to preserve the animals’ lives. Again, the point is not that animals are worthless. The point is that human beings and animals are not regarded as possessing equal moral status in situations of direct moral conflict.

And if they are not morally equivalent, then the argument “we euthanise animals, therefore we may euthanise people” loses much of its force.

Relieving Suffering — and the Limits of Compassion

The emotional force behind assisted suicide arguments is understandable. People do not want others to suffer. Neither do I.

The desire to relieve pain, fear, loneliness, and degradation is deeply human and often compassionate. But compassion alone does not settle the moral question. The real question is this: how far may we go in the attempt to eliminate suffering?

That question matters because not every act motivated by compassion is therefore morally justified.

With animals, euthanasia is often defended on the grounds that we act as caretakers over creatures unable to make rational moral decisions for themselves. But human beings do not occupy that same relationship toward one another. Human beings possess equal moral standing. We do not stand above other people in the way we stand above animals.

This distinction is crucial.

Once intentional killing becomes accepted as a solution to suffering, the moral boundary protecting innocent human life begins to shift. The question gradually changes from “Should we kill?” to “Which suffering justifies killing?” Physical pain? Disability? Psychological distress? Loss of independence? Burdensomeness? Loneliness?

The problem is not compassion. The problem is turning death into the means by which suffering is solved.

Suicide is tragic because it involves the destruction of human life. Homicide is tragic because it involves one person intentionally ending the life of another innocent person. Combining the two does not transform the act into something morally good simply because compassionate intentions are present.

Intentions matter morally, but so do actions themselves.

This does not mean the answer to suffering is simply, “Keep suffering.” Nor does it mean medicine should pursue life prolongation at all costs. There is a moral difference between caring for the dying and intentionally making the dying dead. There is also a difference between allowing natural death and deliberately causing death.

Human beings should receive care, pain relief, dignity, companionship, and protection — especially in weakness and vulnerability. Medicine should relieve suffering wherever ethically possible. But there remains a moral line that should not be crossed: intentionally killing innocent human beings as the solution to suffering itself.

Conclusion

The argument from animal euthanasia initially appears persuasive because it appeals to compassion. But beneath it lies an unexamined assumption: that what is morally appropriate for animals must therefore also be appropriate for human beings.

Yet our moral reasoning consistently recognizes that animals and humans are not interchangeable categories. We value animals, protect them from cruelty, and acknowledge responsibilities toward them. But we do not regard them as possessing the same moral status as human persons.

And that distinction matters profoundly.

The fact that we may sometimes euthanise animals does not establish that we may intentionally end innocent human life. Moral treatment depends upon the kind of being involved. Human beings are not merely animals among animals in the morally relevant sense.

Compassion should move us to care for those who suffer, not to conclude that death is the proper answer to suffering itself.