Is there such a thing as Neutral argument?

Is There Such a Thing as a Neutral Moral Argument?

By Tamlyn de Beer

In discussions about abortion, it is sometimes said that arguments against it are “religious” and therefore should not be used in public reasoning. On the other side, even some who oppose abortion will insist that the argument should not be framed in religious terms, but instead in “scientific” or “secular” language.

Both responses share a common assumption: that there exists a neutral form of moral reasoning which is independent of worldview commitments.

But this raises a deeper question:

Is there such a thing as a neutral moral argument at all?

What do we mean by “secular”?

In ordinary usage, “secular” simply means not explicitly religious. In that sense, there is nothing problematic about secular language or secular reasoning. Much of everyday moral and political discussion takes place in non-religious terms.

But in many debates, “secular” is used in a stronger sense: as if it refers to a neutral, worldview-free standpoint from which moral questions can be assessed.

This stronger claim is what needs to be examined.

Because if “secular” simply means “non-religious,” it does not follow that it is therefore neutral. It may simply mean another worldview operating without reference to God, rather than the absence of worldview altogether.

The hidden assumption: neutrality

The idea that religious arguments should be excluded often rests on the assumption that:

• religious reasoning is “biased,” while
• secular reasoning is “neutral.”

But this distinction is difficult to maintain once we examine how moral arguments actually work.

All moral reasoning depends on deeper assumptions about:

• what human beings are
• whether moral truths exist
• where rights come from
• what counts as harm or benefit
• what kind of reality the world ultimately is

These are not scientific conclusions. They are philosophical commitments—often unstated, but always present.

The disagreement, then, is not between “religious” and “non-religious” reasoning. It is between different accounts of reality.

Science, description, and moral claims

Science plays an essential role in understanding the world, but it operates within a particular scope: it describes what is the case.

It can tell us:

• how human development occurs
• what biological processes are involved in pregnancy
• what happens during abortion procedures

But it does not, by itself, tell us:

• whether those actions are morally permissible
• whether human beings have rights
• why some beings should not be killed

These are not scientific questions. They are questions about value and moral reality.

So while science informs moral reasoning, it cannot replace the philosophical question of what we ought to do.

No worldview-free standpoint

The deeper issue is that no one argues from nowhere.

Even positions that present themselves as purely “secular” rely on assumptions about reality that are not scientifically derived. For example, consequentialist or utilitarian approaches often assume that morality is fundamentally about outcomes such as pleasure, harm, or preference satisfaction.

But why those outcomes, rather than others, should define moral value is not something science can determine. It is a philosophical starting point.

The same is true of any moral framework. The difference is not between “neutral” and “non-neutral” reasoning, but between competing foundations.

Christianity and moral reasoning

From a Christian perspective, moral reasoning is not an attempt to insert religion into an otherwise neutral space. Rather, it is an attempt to reason from what is believed to be the most fundamental account of reality.

On this view, human beings have moral worth because they are created in the image of God. This is not a supplementary claim added onto moral reasoning; it is part of the explanation for why moral reasoning itself is possible and meaningful.

This does not prevent Christians from using philosophical argument, empirical evidence, or logical reasoning. In fact, these tools are shared across worldviews. The difference lies not in the tools, but in the foundations they are applied to.

The real disagreement

The key issue, then, is not whether religious reasoning should be excluded in favour of secular reasoning.

The real question is:

Which account of reality best explains moral experience and moral obligation?

All sides are engaging in worldview-level reasoning, whether explicitly acknowledged or not.

Even the claim that religious arguments should be excluded is itself not a neutral claim—it depends on assumptions about knowledge, truth, and authority.

Why this matters for abortion

In the abortion debate, this becomes especially important.

If moral claims about the unborn depend on deeper questions about what human beings are, where rights come from, and what gives life moral value, then it is impossible to avoid metaphysical commitments altogether.

The disagreement is not between “religious” and “scientific” arguments, but between competing understandings of human nature and moral reality.

To insist on excluding religious reasoning while allowing other philosophical frameworks is not neutrality—it is the adoption of a different worldview as default.

Conclusion

There is no view from nowhere in moral reasoning.

What is often called “secular” reasoning is not neutral, but simply one kind of worldview-based reasoning among others.

The real task is not to remove worldview commitments from the abortion debate, but to examine which worldview gives the most coherent account of what human beings are and how they ought to be treated.

And so the question is not whether we are bringing assumptions into the discussion.

It is whether we are aware of which assumptions we are already using